







Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica 
 




Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties? 
 
Ángel Solano García 
Universidad de Granada 
 
 
 Does Illegal Immigration Empower
Rightist Parties?
Angel Solano García∗
Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica,
Universidad de Granada, 18011 Granada, Spain.
Fax: +34-958-249995 e-mail: asolano@idea.uab.es
March 3, 2006
Abstract The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome
in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration.
In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact
that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In
order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which
the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement
and the way it has to be ﬁnanced. We show that an ideological rather than
a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election.
This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and
rightist parties in several countries.
Keywords Illegal immigration, ideological parties, unskilled and skilled.
JEL Classiﬁcation J61, F22, D72
Previous Version UAB and IAE Working Paper No 614, May 2004
This Version: ThE Papers 06/02, February 2006
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries
where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular
we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are
either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that
we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over
which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it
has to be ﬁnanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic
behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help
∗This paper has been written during my doctorate studies at Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona. I am deeply indebted to Enriqueta Aragonés for motivating me and making me
enjoy a lot my work. I also want to thank Humberto Llavador, Micael Castanheira, Carmen
Bevia, Jordi Masso and Santiago Sanchez-Pagés for their comments and suggestions. Two
anonymous referees improved substantially the paper, I really thank both. Finantial sup-
port from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (BEC2002-002130) and Fundación
Ramón Areces is acknowledged.
1us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in
several countries.1
The ﬁrst question that we have to address is: why the control of immigration
might be the relevant issue in elections? In other words: why immigration is
important for the host country’s voters? Immigration has economic and non-
economic eﬀects in the host country’s society. Regarding the economic eﬀects,
there are empirical and theoretical papers that analyze the immigration’s eﬀect
on natives’ labor market conditions (see Borjas et al (1996)). There are also
other papers exploring the ﬁscal eﬀects of immigration on the governments’ bud-
get and on the provision of public goods (see Razin et al (2002)). However, there
are very few things said about non-economic eﬀects of immigration in the host
country’s society. In this context, Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000)
started a young literature on natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. Looking
at cross-country survey data, this paper and others such as Mayda (2003) ﬁnd
evidence of a robust relationship between attitudes towards immigration and
both security concern and cultural and national identity issues. In this paper
we focus on the eﬀect of immigration on security concern in the host country
i.e. we focus on how immigration aﬀects citizens’ perception about the lack of
security and delinquency in the host country.
Despite of the fact that immigration and delinquency may not be related,
in many countries, the society actually links immigration with delinquency. In
Europe, a survey requested by the European Commission points out that immi-
gration is spontaneously accused of being a major source of insecurity in most
EU-countries. An extreme example can be Greece in which a survey of the po-
lice shows that 92% of the surveyed population believed that the increase in the
crime rate over the 90s has been caused by immigrant criminality (see Karidis,
1998). Regarding the US, a poll (2000) shows that 70% of respondents thought
that immigrants are the cause of higher crime rates (see Cooper, 2003). On the
other hand, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the social con-
cern about insecurity rose in the US together with the society’s fear of massive
immigration.
Together with the current rise of migration ﬂows, illegal immigration is ris-
ing very rapidly in some developed countries. In the US it is estimated that
there were 8 to 11 million of illegal immigrants in 2003. Some countries in
Europe as Italy, Greece and Spain are also receiving large numbers of illegal
immigrants. Regarding the link between illegal immigration and the social per-
ception of insecurity, there are ap r i o r ireasons to think that the link between
illegal immigration and crime may be more real than the link between legal im-
migration and crime. First, illegal immigration has turned into smuggling and
traﬃcking of people as a lucrative business by international crime syndicates.
Frequently, those migrants are caught up in organized crime by these criminal
gangs (see Budapest Group (1999)). Second, in general illegal immigrants face
worse labor market conditions therefore they have a lower cost to switch to the
crime sector. Empirical results on these assertions are rare because of the dif-
ﬁculty to obtain data about illegal immigration. Nevertheless, Coronado and
Orrenius (2003) ﬁnd that illegal immigration through the US-Mexican border
is not related with property crimes but there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation
with violent crimes.
In our model we assume that there exists a positive relation between the
number of illegal immigrants that enter the country and the natives’ perception
2of the lack of security in the host country. Therefore, the number of illegal
immigrants that enter the country aﬀects negatively citizens’ expected utility.
Moreover, we assume that the eﬀects of illegal immigration on citizens’ utility
may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent citizens. Regarding this assumption, Mayda (2003)
ﬁnds empirical evidence that in developed countries unskilled workers’ attitudes
towards immigration are more negative than skilled ones. However, she ﬁnds
that the opposite is true for developing countries. In order to make the analysis
more general we do not consider any restriction about the relative intensity of
skilled and unskilled workers’ attitudes to immigration.
Additionally, illegal immigration is becoming an important political issue in
many developed countries. An example of the increasing importance of illegal
immigration in the political agenda is the growth of the governments’ expenses
devoted to deter it. For instance, the U.S. government has dramatically in-
creased the enforcement of the U.S border over the last two decades, raising
the enforcement budget of the U.S. Border Patrol from $290 million in 1980 to
$1.7 billion in 1998 (in 1998 dollars). Also the number of hours that Border
Patrol oﬃcers spent policing the Mexican border increased from 1.8 million in
1977 to 5.1 million in 1997. As a consequence of this increase of enforcement,
border apprehensions rose from 200.000 in 1970 to 1.5 million in 1999 (see Orre-
nius (2001) and Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001)). The European Union is also
paying special attention to this issue as it was shown in the European Council
meeting in Seville.2
In our model we assume initially that there exists an exogenous potential
mass of illegal immigration that is willing to enter a country. The government
of the country may implement a level of border enforcement in order to try to
deter such illegal immigration from entering it. We can interpret the level of
border enforcement as the government’s expenses devoted to external border
protection plus deportation costs.
We assume that an increase in border enforcement would decrease the num-
ber of illegal immigrants entering the country although at a decreasing rate. A
justiﬁcation for this assumption comes from the fact that border enforcement
contributes to expand the very proﬁtable human smuggling industry as it is said
in a study by the Public Policy Institute of California in 2002.3 More border
enforcement implies a better organized strategy to cross the borders so a more
intensive learning process by people-smmuglers on how to evade new obstacles.
This argument is also supported by Cornelius (2004) who ﬁnds it as the most
plausible explanation for the behavior of both the number of apprehensions
and the expenditure on border enforcement in the US southwest border during
the period 1994-2001. Actually, the study underlines that "apprehensions rose
sharply along the southwest border from Fiscal Year 1994 through 2001, as the
border was being fortiﬁed", but beginning in 2001 when the learning process
was complete, "apprehensions fell by about 25 percent each year for two ﬁscal
years". Another important assumption is increasing eﬃcacy of border enforce-
ment with respect to the number of potential illegal immigrants. Using a similar
argument, the more migrants willing to cross the border the less organized cross-
ings, thus the larger eﬃcacy of the border enforcement policy. The same study
points out that the increase in the eﬃcacy of the border enforcement (measured
by the increase in the number of apprehensions) in the last quarter of 2003 "can
be attributed largely to the U.S. economic recovery, which was creating large
numbers of jobs and attracting new ﬁrst-time migrants to the United States".
3To ﬁnance border enforcement the government charges an ad valorem per-
sonal income tax on native workers. The Government may introduce a certain
level of progressivity in the tax scheme charging a lower ad valorem personal
income tax to low income workers than to high income ones. We assume that
the government’s budget constrain has to be balanced.
We analyze the political outcome of a two party electoral competition model.
The choices of parties are the instruments described before: the level of border
enforcement and the progressivity of the tax scheme. We suppose that parties
are fully committed to implement the policy announced during the electoral
campaign. We show two diﬀerent scenarios depending on whether parties are
opportunistic or ideological.
We ﬁnd that when parties are opportunistic, the unique equilibrium outcome
is that both parties win the election with the same probability and propose the
same pair of policies. These equilibrium policies will coincide with the optimal
policies for the median voter. Nevertheless, when parties are ideological the
political outcome in equilibrium is that a unique party surely wins the election
and the equilibrium policy implemented may be diﬀerent from the optimal one
for the median voter. Therefore, ideology gives one party an advantage to win
the election.
Ideology of a party is deﬁned in our model as a strong preference on one
policy instrument. In particular, when parties are ideological we consider two
possibilities: i) both parties’ ideology is determined by the progressivity on taxes
and ii) both parties’ ideology is determined by the level of border enforcement.
The ﬁrst case could be applied to countries in which illegal immigration becomes
an important issue very recently, and therefore, it can be supposed that parties
would not have an ideological position on this issue yet. The second case could
be applied to countries in which illegal immigration has been an important issue
for some time, and therefore, it can be supposed that parties would already have
an ideological position on this issue.
In this context, one of our main ﬁndings is that, in the presence of par-
ties ideologically determined by the border enforcement, the more intense the
relationship between insecurity and illegal immigration is for skilled workers,
the more likely the most rightist party wins in developed countries (where the
median voter is skilled). Also, the higher the number of potential illegal immi-
grants is, the more likely the rightist party wins in developed countries. Both
results seem to be quite intuitive. We shall comment other results in the last
section of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we formally
describe the model. In Section 3 we analyze the properties of the voters’ indirect
utility functions with respect to the policy instruments. In Section 4 we focus on
the political competition considering diﬀerent scenarios where political parties
are either opportunistic or ideological. In section 5 we analyze the case of an
endogenous number of illegal immigrants willing to enter the country. Finally,
in Section 6 we conclude andd i s c u ss o m er e s u l t s .
2 The Model
Consider a country in which population is composed by native workers and
illegal immigrants. In our model the number and role played by legal immigrants
4is negligible since we assume that they do not have a relevant eﬀect on social
insecurity and they cannot participate in elections.
2.1 Native workers
Native workers care about their private consumption and about the number of
illegal immigrants living in the country (I). We assume that illegal immigration
has a negative eﬀect on native workers’ expected utility. This eﬀect is induced
by the natives’ perception that illegal immigration rise delinquency and social
insecurity. Native workers’ expected utility function is assumed to take the
following functional form:
Ui(ci,I)=ci − βiI,( 1 )
where ci is the consumption level of worker i and βi ∈ R+ a parameter which
measures the impact of illegal immigration on the utility of worker i.
Native workers receive an income or salary wi which, after paying taxes, is
spent fully in consumption. Hence, native workers’ budget constraint can be
written as:
ci =( 1− ti)wi i = u,s,( 2 )
where ti is the ”ad valorem” personal income tax imposed on worker i by the
government. We assume that salaries are exogenously determined.
For simplicity let assume that there are only two types of native workers:
skilled and unskilled, denoted by the subindex i = u,s. We assume that the
number of skilled and unskilled workers is S and U respectively. We also assume
that skilled workers’ wage is higher than unskilled workers’ one i.e. ws >w u.
2.2 Illegal Immigration
We assume that the amount of illegal immigration that enters the country de-
pends on the amount of immigration which is willing to reach illegally the coun-
try and it also depends on the resources devoted by the government to border
enforcement. Suppose that there is a potential mass of immigrants that wants
to enter illegally the country (Y ) and that only a fraction of this mass actu-
ally enters (I ≤ Y ). That restriction on the entry is costly for the government
which may spend a positive amount of money in border enforcing policy (E).
Thus, the number of illegal immigrants that enter the country can be written
as I(Y,E).
We assume that the number of illegal immigrants that enter the country
(I) decreases with the level of border enforcement (E), that is, IE(Y,E) < 0;
and it increases with the number of potential illegal immigrants (Y ), that is
IY (Y,E) > 0.W e i n t e r p r e t IE(Y,E) as a measure of eﬃcacy of the border
enforcement policy. We assume decreasing rates of return of I with respect to the
level of border enforcement, i.e. IEE(Y,E) > 0.T h a ti s ,e ﬃcacy is decreasing on
the level of border enforcement. Moreover, we assume that IEY(Y,E) < 0,i . e .
eﬃcacy of border enforcement is increasing on the number of potential illegal
immigrants. Finally, we assume that if the government spends no money in
border enforcement all illegal immigrants will enter the country, i.e. I(Y,0) = Y .
52.3 Government’s budget constraint
The government uses taxes to fund the total resources spent in border enforce-
ment policy. We assume that the government’s budget is always balanced, that
is,
E = tuUwu + tsSws (3)
Notice that all, workers in the same group (skilled or unskilled) receive the
same salary and pay the same personal income tax. However, workers belong-
i n gt od i ﬀerent groups obtain diﬀerent salaries and may pay diﬀerent personal
income tax. We assume that the government may propose a certain level of
progressivity in their tax schemes:
tu = αts α ∈ [0,1], (4)
where α is the level of progressivity of the government’s tax scheme. Notice
that the tax scheme is more progressive as α is closer to 0 and conversely, when
it is equal to 1 we are in the case of a pure proportional tax scheme.
From the government’s budget constraint we have that the level of border en-
forcement E oﬀered by the government is the following function of the personal
income tax imposed on skilled workers:
E = ts (αUwu + Sws) (5)
3 Indirect Utility functions
Our main goal is to obtain the policy outcome of political competition, regarding
the policy instruments. To do that we characterize the utility of the voters as a
function of the government’s policy instruments: the level of border enforcement
E and the level of progressivity of the taxes α.
First, we compute the level of E that maximizes the utility function of each
type of voter (skilled or unskilled workers) for a given value of α, subject to
the worker’s budget constraint. Since given a pair of values for E and α,t h e
balanced GBC (government’s budget constraint) deﬁnes a unique value for the
taxes, we need to consider the GBC as an additional feasibility constraint in the
maximization of the utility functions.
Thus, for a given α, the optimal level of E for skilled workers is the solution





s.t. (2) and (5).
(6)
Solving for the ﬁrst order condition we obtain a condition on the marginal




βs (αUwu + Sws)
(7)
This equation deﬁnes the level of border enforcement that maximizes skilled
workers’ utility (E∗
s)f o rag i v e nv a l u eo fα.
6Similarly, for a given α, the optimal level of E for unskilled workers is the




βu (αUwu + Sws)
(8)
This equation deﬁnes the level of border enforcement that maximizes un-
skilled workers’ utility (E∗
u(α)) for a given value of α. Notice that for α =0 ,
since IE(Y,E) < 0 for all E ∈ R+, the FOC is not satisﬁed and therefore,
the optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers is the maximum
feasible level, that is Emax = Sws.4
Comparing the diﬀerent optimal levels of border enforcement for skilled and
unskilled workers we can state the following two propositions:
Proposition 1 E∗
s(α) is increasing on α and E∗
u(α) is decreasing on α
Proof. To prove that E∗
s(α) is increasing on α consider two diﬀerent values
of α1 and α2 such that, α2 ≥ α1. From the skilled workers’ FOC we have that
IE(Y,E) is an increasing function of α. Hence, IE(Y,E∗
s(α2)) ≥ IE(Y,E∗
s(α1))
but since we assumed IEE(Y,E) > 0, this implies that E∗
s(α2) ≥ E∗
s(α1).T h u s ,
E∗
s(α) is increasing on α.
To prove E∗
u(α) is decreasing on α, notice that by the same argument we
need to show that IE(Y,E∗
u(α1)) ≥ IE(Y,E∗
u(α2)). But this is true iﬀ:
α1wu
βu (α1Uwu + Sws)
≤
α2wu
βu (α2Uwu + Sws)
⇔
α1α2Uwu + α1Sws ≤ α1α2Uwu + α2Sws
Which is equivalent to say that α1 ≤ α2. Thus, it always holds and we obtain
that E∗
u(α) is decreasing on α.
This proposition says that when there is a decrease in the progressivity of the
tax scheme skilled workers will prefer a higher level of border enforcement and
unskilled workers will prefer a lower one. If the tax is more proportional skilled
workers have to contribute less, in relative terms, in other words, E becomes
cheaper for skilled workers for more proportional tax schemes. Therefore, a
government that tries to obtain the vote of skilled workers will propose a lower
level of E for more progressive tax schemes. Similarly a government that tries
to obtain the vote of unskilled workers will propose a higher level of E for more
progressive tax schemes.
The next proposition shows that given a level of progressivity of the tax
scheme (α) unskilled workers will prefer a higher level of border enforcement
















s(α)) which is equivalent to:
7−αwu
βu (αUwu + Sws)
≥
−ws


































That is, given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme (α), unskilled workers
prefer a higher E than skilled workers if and only if the marginal eﬀect of illegal
immigration on a worker’ s utility relative to what she pay to deter such illegal







Notice that if under a less progressive government (larger α)t h eo p t i m a l
border enforcement for unskilled workers is larger than for skilled workers it is
also true under a more progressive government (smaller α). This result can be
summarize in the following Corollary:





Given a ﬁxed value of α, substituting the optimal level of border enforcement
in the utility function of each type of worker we obtain the workers’ maximal
utility for each value of α.
Us(α)=( 1− t∗
s(E∗




u(α),α))wu − βuI (Y,E∗
u(α))
What is worker i’s welfare eﬀect due to a change in the progressivity of the
tax scheme assuming that the government is implementing her optimal level of
border enforcement? A change in α has two eﬀects on worker i0s utility:
1. A tax eﬀect. A change in α implies a change in the ad valorem income
tax that the worker has to pay, and therefore in her consumption. Hence, the








Notice that the change of the ad valorem income tax produced by a change









































we can only conclude that the tax eﬀect will be positive or negative, depending
on the value of α. That is, assuming that the government will implement the
optimal level of border enforcement of skilled workers, a decrease of the level of
progressivity of the tax scheme leads them to choose a higher optimal level of
border enforcement. Depending on how intense will be such increase in border
enforcement with respect to α their personal income tax (t∗
s) will increase or
decrease with α. Similarly, if we assume that the government will implement the
unskilled workers’ optimal level of border enforcement, their personal income tax
will increase or decrease with the level of progressivity of the tax scheme. It will
also depend on the intensity of such progressivity change over the optimal level
of border enforcement of unskilled workers.
2. An immigration eﬀect. A change in α implies a change in the optimal
level of border enforcement, and therefore, a change in the amount of illegal
immigrants that will enter the country.














we have that a decrease in the progressivity of the taxes (increase of α)
implies a larger optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers and a



















Hence, an increase of α will reduce the number of illegal immigrants that
enter the country if the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers
is implemented. However it will increase the number of illegal immigrants if the
optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers is implemented.
Notice also that an increase in α will be positive for all workers (skilled
and unskilled) if the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers is
implemented. However it will be negative for all workers if the optimal level of
border enforcement for unskilled workers is implemented.
W h e nw es u mu pb o t he ﬀects we obtain that an increase of α has an un-
ambiguous total eﬀect on worker i’s welfare assuming that the government is
implementing her optimal level of border enforcement. More precisely, if the gov-
ernment implements the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers
an increase of α will make skilled workers better oﬀ. However, if the govern-
ment implements the optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers











Proof. Let T = αUwu + Sws. If the government implements the optimal



















































Similarly, if the government implements the optimal level of border enforce-











































T2 wuSws < 0
Regarding the optimal level of progressivity for a given level of border en-
forcement it is easy to see by Proposition 3 that the optimal α for skilled workers
is α∗
s(E)=1for all E>0 and any α∗
s(E) ∈ [0,1] for E =0 .T h i sm e a n st h a tf o r
all E>0 skilled workers prefer a pure proportional tax scheme. However, the
optimal α for unskilled workers is α∗
u(E)=0for all E>0 and any α∗
u(E) ∈ [0,1]
for E =0 .T h i sm e a n st h a tf o ra l lE>0 unskilled workers prefer not to pay
taxes at all.
104 Political competition
In the model described so far we have assumed that there exists a government
that in order to deter illegal immigration implements a level of border enforce-
ment (E). This border enforcement policy is funded by the revenues obtained
from a personal income tax over national workers (t) which, by means of the
level of progressivity of such tax scheme (α)m a yb ed i ﬀerent for skilled and
unskilled workers. Thus, the government’s choices are represented by a triplet
(E,t,α)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the government’s budget constraint. Notice that if the
government’s budget constraint has to be satisﬁed, choosing only two of these
three variables determines a unique value for the third one. Without loss of
generality we assume that the level of border enforcement and the level of pro-
gressivity of the tax scheme (E,α) are the choices of the government. Then, the
ad valorem tax will be given by the government’s budget constraint for each
pair of values for E and α.
In this section we analyze the political competition before the government
is elected. We consider a model of two party competition. As we explained
above, parties’ choices are represented by the level of border enforcement and
the level of progressivity of the tax scheme (Ej,α j). Thus, the policy space is
X = R+ × [0,1].
We assume that every national worker votes for a party (there is no ab-
stention). Illegal immigrants have no right to vote. We also assume that legal
immigrations have no right to vote. Thus, only native workers can vote. A
national worker will vote for the party whose proposal gives her a higher level
of utility. That is, worker i will vote for a party 1 if Ui(E1, α1) >U i(E2, α2)
and she will vote for party 2 if Ui(E2, α2) >U i(E1, α1). In case of indiﬀerence,
a voter is assumed to vote for each party with equal probability.
The game takes place in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, parties propose a
certain policy in X. In the second stage each voter votes for the party whose
proposal would give him a higher utility. We assume that parties are fully
committed to their policy proposals. This means that the party that wins the
election has to implement the policy chosen in the ﬁrst stage.
The winner of the election is decided according to majority rule. In case
of a tie, both parties win with the same probability (equal to 1
2). We assume
that parties maximize the probability of winning. Thus, the payoﬀ function of









2 if #{v : Uv(Ej,α j) >U v(Ek,α k)} + B
2 = S+U
2
0 if #{v : Uv(Ej,α j) >U v(Ek,α k)} + B
2 < S+U
2
where #{v : Uv(Ej,α j) >U v(Ek,α k)} is the number of voters who prefer to
vote for party j ( j 6= k)a n dB =#{v : Uv(Ej,α j)=Uv(Ek,α k)} is the number
of voters that are indiﬀerent between the two parties. So, if the number of voters
that prefer to vote for party j plus half of voters which are indiﬀerent between
the two parties is larger than the half of total voters, party j will win the election.
We consider three diﬀerent scenarios depending on the composition of the
parties’ strategy set. In the ﬁrst scenario, we assume that a party has to de-
cide about both variables simultaneously. In this case a strategy is deﬁned as
(Ej,α j) ∈ X. Thus, in this scenario parties are purely opportunistic. In the
11second scenario, we assume that the level of progressivity for each party is ﬁxed
and they cannot decide about it. Parties can decide only the level of border
enforcement. Thus, a strategy for a party j is Ej ∈ R+.I nt h i sc a s e ,p a r t i e sa r e
ideological with respect to the progressivity of the taxes. That is, parties want
to win the election in order to implement their favorite level of progressivity
of the tax scheme. Finally, in the third scenario, we assume that the level of
border enforcement for each party is ﬁxed and they can decide only the level of
progressivity of the tax scheme. Hence, a strategy for a party is αj ∈ [0,1].I n
this case, parties are ideological with respect to the border enforcement policy.
That is, parties want to win the election in order to implement their favorite
border enforcement policy.
Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model, we deﬁne
an equilibrium of the game only in terms of the strategies of the two parties
at the ﬁrst stage. Thus, in the ﬁrst game a pure strategy equilibrium is a
pair of values for the level of progressivity of the tax scheme and the level of




2)] such that both parties
are maximizing the probability of winning given the choices of the opponent.
In the second game, given α1 and α2 a pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of
values for the level of border enforcement [(Ee
1(α1,α 2),Ee
2(α1,α 2)] such that
both parties are maximizing the probability of winning given the choice of the
opponent. Finally, in the third game, given E1 and E2 ﬁxed a pure strategy
equilibrium is a pair of values for the level of progressivity of the tax scheme
[αe
1(E1,E 2),α e
2(E1,E 2)] such that both parties are maximizing the probability
of winning given the choice of the opponent.
4.1 Opportunistic parties
Suppose that parties are purely opportunistic, i.e., they choose both the level
of border enforcement and the progressivity of the tax scheme in order to win
the elections.
An important variable for political parties will be the number of skilled an
unskilled workers because the preferences of the median voter coincide with the
preferences of the majority of the society.
If S>Uthe median voter will be skilled and, in order to maximize the
probability of winning, parties will try to obtain the vote of skilled workers.
Given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme α, the largest utility that a
party can oﬀer to a skilled worker is Us(E∗
s(α),α), that is, the skilled workers’
utility when the government implements the optimal level of border enforcement
for skilled workers. Additionally, given a positive level of border enforcement
E, the maximum utility that a party can oﬀer to a skilled worker is Us(E,1),
that is, the skilled workers’ utility when the government implements the optimal
level of progressivity of the tax scheme for skilled workers (α∗
s(E)=1 ).
Similarly, if U>Sthe median voter will be unskilled and, in order to
maximize the probability of winning, parties will try to obtain the vote of the
unskilled workers. Given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme α, the highest
utility that a party can oﬀer to unskilled worker is Uu(E∗
u(α),α),t h a ti s ,t h e
unskilled workers’ utility when the government implements the optimal level of
border enforcement for unskilled workers. Additionally, given a positive level of
border enforcement E, the highest utility that a party can oﬀer to an unskilled
worker is Uu(E,0), that is, the unskilled workers’ utility when the government
12implements the optimal level of progressivity of the tax scheme for unskilled
workers (α∗
u(E)=0 )
Proposition 4 When parties choose both α and E simultaneously the unique
equilibrium outcome will be a tie: both parties win the election with probability
equal to 1





u(0),0)] iﬀ U>S .
Proof. Since both parties are ap r i o r iidentical if one of them chooses
(E,α) such that it wins the election with probability 1 it could not be an
equilibrium because her opponent may choose the same (E,α) and win the
election with probability 1
2. Thus, if the outcome of the game is not a tie,
matching the opponent´s strategy is always a proﬁtable deviation for one of the
parties. Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome will be that both parties win
the election with probability equal to 1
2.
If S>Uthe party that oﬀers a pair (E,α) such that the utility of skilled
workers is higher will win the election. Given a pair of values (E1,α 1) with
α1 < 1, party 2 can win the election with probability equal to 1 choosing
E2 = E1 and α2 >α 1. Thus in equilibrium we must have both parties choosing
α2 = α1 =1 .
Suppose that α2 = α1 =1and party 1 chooses E1 6= E∗
s(1), then party 2
can win the election choosing E2 = E∗
s(1). Thus, in equilibrium we must have
both parties choosing E1 = E2 = E∗
s(1). Hence, [E∗
s(1),1] has to be chosen by
both parties at equilibrium.
Similarly, we can prove that if U>S ,then [(E∗
u(0),0),(E∗
u(0),0)] can be
sustained as an equilibrium.
4.2 Ideological Parties
We present now two scenarios in which parties are ideological. We consider
ideology as an strong preference on one of the policy instruments. First, we
suppose that parties’ ideology is determined by the progressivity of the tax
scheme and ﬁnally that it is determined by the intensity of protection against
illegal immigration.
4.2.1 Parties’ Ideology determined by α
Suppose that the level of progressivity of the tax scheme is ﬁxed for both parties
(and diﬀerent for diﬀerent parties). We will denote by leftist party the party
which is committed to a higher level of progressivity of the tax scheme (αl)a n d
rightist party the one committed to a lower level of progressivity (αr >α l).
Ideology can be interpreted in this game as the progressivity of tax schemes
oﬀered by parties. In this case parties only have to propose the level of border
enforcement. We can interpret this scenario to countries in which the immigra-
tion become an important issue recently and parties do not have an ideological
position yet on it.
If S>U , the median voter will be skilled and political parties will center
their proposals on skilled workers. Notice that the best that a party can do in
this case is to chose the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers,
given its own value of α.T h a t i s E∗
s(αl) for the leftist party and E∗
s(αr) for
13the rightist party. From Proposition 3 we know that
dUs(E∗
s(α),α)
dα > 0.S i n c e
αr >α l, it implies that Us(E∗
s(αr),α r) >U(E∗
s(αl),α l). Therefore, the rightist
party has a strategy that guarantees him a sure win.
Similarly if U>S ,s i n c e
dUu(E∗
u(α),α)
dα < 0 and αr >α l,w eh a v et h a t
Uu(E∗
u(αl),α l) >U(E∗
u(αr),α r). Therefore the leftist party can win the election
supporting E∗
u(αl).
Those levels of border enforcement may constitute a particular pure strategy
equilibrium for each case. We calculate all the possible pure strategy Nash
equilibria of the game and we state them in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose αl <α r are ﬁxed and parties choose E:
(i) if S>Uthe rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies Er ∈ R+ s.t. Us(Er,α r) >U s(E∗
s(αl),α l) and the equilibrium outcome of
the election is rightist party wins the election with probability 1.
(ii) if U>Sthe leftist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies El ∈ R+ s.t. Uu(El,α l) >U u(E∗
u(αr),α r) and the equilibrium outcome of
the election is leftist party wins the election with probability 1.
Proof. If S>Uthe winner of the election is the party that oﬀers the level
of border enforcement that makes skilled workers better oﬀ. Then given a level
of progressivity of the tax scheme such that αl <α r,the best replies for each
party can be written as:
BRl =
½
El ∈ R+ s.t. Us(El,α l) >U s(Er,α r) if Er ∈ R+ \ K
El ∈ R+ if Er ∈ K
BRr = {Er ∈ R+ s.t. Us(Er,α r) >U s(El,α l) for all El ∈ R+},
where K ≡ {E ∈ R+ s.t. Us(E,αr) >U s(E∗
s(αl),α l)} represents the set of dom-
inant strategies for the rightist party. It is no empty since E∗
s(αr) ∈ K.
Then since, Us(E,αr) >U s(E,αl) for all E ∈ R+ we have that if the
rightist party chooses a level of border enforcement Er ∈ K then this party
will win the election with probability 1. Hence, [(El ∈ R+);(Er ∈ R+ s.t.
Us(Er,α r) >U s(E∗
s(αl),α l))] are the pure strategy equilibria of the game and
the outcome of the election will be that the rightist party wins with probability
1.
When U>Sthe proof is similar to the one written above.
Figure 1 represents the range of equilibrium values for the level of border
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Figure 1 Range of Equilibrium Levels of Er
To summarize, whenever Parties’ ideology is determined by α, rightist party
has an advantage to capture skilled workers’ vote, and leftist party has an ad-
vantage to capture unskilled workers’ vote. Thus, the outcome of the election
is totally determined by the composition of the population.
4.2.2 Parties’ Ideology determined by E
We will assume now that parties are committed to implement a speciﬁcb o r d e r
enforcement policy. We denote by leftist party the party which is committed
to a lower level of border enforcement and rightist party the one committed
to a higher level of border enforcement (i.e. Er >E l). Thus, ideology can
be interpreted in this game as the intensity of protection against immigration.
Assuming that the level of border enforcement is ﬁxed for parties they only have
to propose a level of progressivity of their tax schemes. We can interpret this
scenario to countries in which the immigration become for some time an issue
and parties have already an ideological position on it.
If S>Uthe median voter will be a skilled worker and given a certain level
of border enforcement E, any political party will try to propose a value for α in
order to give skilled workers a level of utility higher than the one oﬀered by her
opponent. Since the level of border enforcement is given, the number of illegal
immigrants entering the country is also given. Thus, parties will want to oﬀer
av a l u ef o rα that minimizes the tax imposed to skilled workers.
Given a ﬁxed value of E , the optimal value of α for skilled workers is α =1 .
Thus, the maximal utility that party j can oﬀer to skilled workers given a ﬁxed
value of Ej is Us(Ej,1). Then, if Us(El,1) >U s(Er,1) the leftist party has a
nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her a sure victory (this set
will include αl =1 ). Otherwise if Us(Er,1) >U s(El,1) the rightist party has
a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her a sure victory (this
set will include αr =1 ). Finally, if Us(Er,1) = Us(El,1) then both parties can
assure a tie by choosing αj =1 .
15Notice that if both parties choose the value for α that minimizes the tax
imposed to skilled workers (i.e. αj =1 ) the rightist party will win the election
iﬀ Us(Er,1) >U s(El,1).T h a ti s :







We state the previous result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose Er >E l are ﬁxed and parties choose α then if S>U
we have that the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strategies
and the equilibrium outcome of the election is rightist party wins the election with
probability 1 iﬀ:






The inequality written in the proposition is composed by two positive terms
since Er >E l and IE(Y,E) < 0. The one in the left hand side represents
the impact of a change in border enforcement policy on the number of illegal
immigrants entering the country. That is the eﬃcacy of the border enforcement.
The one in the right hand side represents the participation in the ﬁnancing
of the border enforcement policy for an skilled worker relative to her illegal
immigration marginal eﬀect when both parties propose the minimum level of
progressivity αj =1 .
This Proposition shows that the eﬃcacy of border enforcement policy (
−4I(Y,E)
4E )
matters. In particular, if eﬃcacy is higher enough rightist party surely wins
the election. However, since IEE(Y,E) > 0,e ﬃcacy is decreasing on E which
means that the lower level of border enforcement committed to by both parties
the higher the probability of winning for the rightist party.
More comparative statics can be done. For instance, as skilled workers’
negative concern about illegal immigration increases (higher values of βs) skilled
workers will tend to vote for the rightist party and she will be more likely to win
the election. In this context, one can think that rightist parties might have an
interest to rise skilled workers’ negative perception about illegal immigration.
Also, since IEY(Y,E) < 0, i.e. eﬃcacy of border enforcement is increasing
on the potential illegal immigration, a higher potential illegal immigration will
help rightist parties to win the election. Hence, rightist party is more likely to
win as the external threat is higher.
Similarly, if U>S , the median voter will be unskilled and given a certain
level of border enforcement Ej any party would choose a value of αj in order
to give to unskilled workers a higher utility level than her opponent. As we
have seen above, since the level of illegal immigration is given parties will oﬀer
a value of αj in order to minimize the tax imposed to unskilled workers to fund
the given level of border enforcement.
In this case, given a ﬁxed value of E, the optimal value for the unskilled
workers is α =0 . Thus the maximal utility that party j can oﬀer to unskilled
workers given a ﬁxed value of Ej is Uu(Ej,0). Then, if Uu(Er,0) >U u(El,0)
the rightist party has a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her
a sure victory (this set will include αl =0 ). Otherwise if Uu(El,0) >U u(Er,0)
the leftist party has a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her
16a sure victory. Finally, if Uu(Er,0) = Uu(El,0) then both parties can assure a
tie by choosing αj =0 .
We know that Uu(Er,0) >U u(El,0) iﬀ:
0 >β u (I (Y,Er) − I (Y,El))
But this condition is always satisﬁed since Er >E l and IE(Y,E) < 0.S o ,
we can conclude that the rightist party always wins the election choosing the
maximum level of progressivity of the tax scheme αr =0 . We set this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose Er >E l are ﬁxed and parties choose α then if U>S
the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strategies and the equi-
librium outcome of the election is rightist party wins the election with probability
1.
Proof. Since Ej i sg i v e nw eh a v et h a tUu(Ej,α j) is a decreasing function of
αj. Thus, the maximal utility that party j can oﬀer to unskilled workers given
a ﬁxed value of Ej is Uu(Ej,0). Given Er >E l if both parties choose αj =0
we have that:
Uu(Er,0) − Uu(El,0) = βu (I (Y,El) − I (Y,Er)) > 0
Therefore, the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies (which include αr =0 ) and the equilibrium outcome of the election is
rightist party wins the election with probability 1.
So, whenever parties’ ideology is determined by border protection, composi-
tion of the population does not entirely determine the outcome of the election.
More precisely, in countries in which there are more unskilled than skilled work-
ers rightist party has an advantage to capture the unskilled workers’ vote. So, in
this case, composition of the population determines the political outcome. How-
ever, in countries where there are more skilled than unskilled workers, skilled
workers will vote for the rightist party if their optimal level of border enforce-
ment is high enough. Thus, in this case, the outcome of the election does not
only depend on the composition of the population but also in some parameters
such as βs or Y. So that, for values of βs or Y large enough, rightist parties have
an advantage to win independently on the population structure of the country.
5 Endogenous Y.
In this section we endogenize the potential number of migrants that want to
enter the country. To do so, we assume that this number depends on the expen-
diture on enforcement policy and the wage earned by the unskilled workers, i.e.
Y (E,wu).W el e tY depends on wages for unskilled workers since most of the il-
legal immigrants, independently on their skill level, end up working in unskilled
jobs. We consider that the enforcement policy does not aﬀect unskilled workers’
wage as the empirical evidence predict.6 More precisely, we assume that border
enforcement policy discourage illegal entry, that is, YE < 0, and an increase in
unskilled workers’ wages encourage illegal entry, that is, Ywu > 0. Therefore,
in this case the border enforcement policy reduces directly illegal immigration
by increasing apprehensions but alternatively it reduces illegal immigration by
17discouraging illegal entry. That is since now the number of illegal immigrants











∂E < 0 is the eﬀect of the border enforcement policy on the number
of apprehensions, and ∂I
∂Y
∂Y
∂E < 0 (since ∂I
∂Y > 0 and ∂Y
∂E < 0) is the discouraging
eﬀect of the border enforcement on the number of illegal immigrants that wants
to enter the country.
Regarding the optimal level of border enforcement given a certain α we










βu (αUwu + Sws)
Notice that incorporating the eﬀect of the border enforcement on the number
of illegal immigrants that wants to enter the country both skilled and unskilled
workers prefer a larger border enforcement policy given a certain level of pro-
gressivity in the tax scheme.














i = u,s. Given our previous assumption of decreasing eﬃcacy of border
enforcement with respect to the level of border enforcement itself, and increasing
eﬃcacy of border enforcement with respect to the number of potential illegal
immigrants we have that ∂2I
∂E2 > 0, and ∂2I
∂Y∂E < 0. In addition, we assumed
above that ∂Y
∂E < 0 and ∂I
∂Y > 0. Therefore, a suﬃcient but not necessary
condition for the SOC to be satisﬁed is that the eﬃcacy of border enforcement
to discourage illegal entry be decreasing with respect to the level of border
enforcement itself, i.e. ∂2Y
∂E2 < 0.7
Regarding the optimal level of progressivity in the tax scheme given a certain
E we obtain the same results than when Y was exogenous.
Notice that from Proposition 1 to Proposition 5 all results remain the
same. However, we obtain that assuming that the number of illegal immigrants
that want to enter the country is endogenous, rightists parties win more likely
in developed countries in which immigration is an old issue. By Proposition 6
we have that the rightist party wins the election with probability equal to one
in countries where S>Uiﬀ:






In the context of endogenous Y , this inequality becomes easier to satisfy.
That is because of now Y (Er,w u) <Y(El,w u) and therefore the left hand side
of the inequlity becomes larger (while the right hand side remains the same).
This result reinforces our claim that parties’ ideology gives an advantage for
the rightist party to win whenever immigration is a salient issue.
186C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we ask ourselves whether ideology can be useful for parties to
win elections when the relevant issue is the control of immigration. In order
to answer this question we analyze diﬀerent scenarios depending on whether
parties are either opportunistic or ideological. In addition, assuming ideological
parties, we consider diﬀerent cases depending on whether ideology is either
determined by the level of border enforcement or by level of progressivity in
the tax scheme. Using a very simple two party competition model we ﬁnd the
following conclusions:
1. When parties are purely opportunistic, i.e. they can choose both E
and α, in equilibrium, they always tie and choose the same pair of policies.
This equilibrium policies coincide with the optimal ones for the median voter.
However, when parties are ideological in equilibrium there is a unique winner
and the policies implemented may not be the optimal ones for the median voter.
Therefore, in general ideology gives a party an advantage to win the election.
2. If illegal immigration is a new phenomenon in the host country, i.e.
parties’ ideology is determined by α, in equilibrium, the rightist party always
wins the election in developed countries (where the majority of population is
skilled) while the leftist party always wins in developing countries (where the
majority of population is unskilled). The intuition behind this result is that
voters will vote for the party who gives them a cheaper border enforcement.
Obviously, the rightist party (less progressive party) may oﬀer a cheaper border
enforcement to skilled workers while leftist party (more progressive party) may
oﬀer a cheaper border enforcement to unskilled workers. Thus if the median
voter is skilled the rightist party wins otherwise if the median voter is unskilled
the leftist party wins.
3. If illegal immigration has been an issue for some time in the host country,
i.e. parties’ ideology is determined by E, in equilibrium, the rightist party
always wins the election in developing countries (where the majority of the
population is unskilled). That is because political competition make parties
choose high levels of progressivity which implies that the optimal level of border
enforcement for the median voter (unskilled) will be also high. Therefore, the
most anti-immigrant party has an advantage to win the election.
However, in developed countries (where the majority of the population is
skilled) the political outcome depends on other variables such as the skilled
workers’ perception about the relationship between illegal immigration and in-
security, and the eﬃcacy of the border enforcement policy. In this context, we
ﬁnd that if skilled workers believe more intensively that illegal immigration is
linked to delinquency and to insecurity, in equilibrium, the rightist party (the
most anti-immigrant party) wins more likely. In addition, we ﬁnd that as the
border enforcement policy is more eﬃcacious, in equilibrium, the rightist party
wins more likely. Both results seem to be quite intuitive since either a higher
eﬀect of illegal immigration on skilled workers’ utility or a high eﬃcacy of the
border enforcement make skilled workers (the majority of the population) prefer
a higher level of border enforcement.
4. In this context, with respect to the eﬃcacy of the border enforcement
we assume that it is increasing in the number of potential illegal immigrants.
Then, the higher the number of potential illegal immigrants the more likely the
rightist party wins the election in equilibrium.
195. If we assume that the border enforcement reduces the number of potential
illegal immigrants we ﬁnd that, with such a discouraging eﬀect, rightist parties
win more frequently that if we assume that the number of potential illegal
immigrants is exogenously given.
6. Regarding the policy implications, in countries where illegal immigration
is a new phenomenon there is no policy implication because the composition
of population determines the political outcome. However, in countries where
illegal immigration is an old phenomenon we ﬁnd some policy implications. In
this type of countries we want to emphasize the conﬂict of interests between the
rightist and leftist party about some aspects such as the concern that skilled
workers have about illegal immigration and the eﬃcacy of the border enforce-
ment policy. As far as our results are concerned a natural implication is that
the rightist party would have interests in rise the concern about illegal immigra-
tion among skilled workers and improve the eﬃcacy of the border enforcement
policy. Nevertheless, the leftist party would have interests in reduce the concern
about illegal immigration among skilled workers and lower the eﬃcacy of the
border enforcement policy.
Endnotes
1 F o re x a m p l e ,t h eN a t i o n a lF r o n th e a d e db yJ e a nM a r i eL eP e ni nF r a n c e ,H a i d e r ’ s
Freedom party in Austria, Fortuyn’s party in the Netherlands or Berlusconi’s party in
Italy.
2 The President of European Comission, presently Romano Prody, proposed to
strengthen the control of the external borders by developing the concept of an inte-
grated and comprehensive ”border strategy” for EU.
3 Other studies show that as border control has tightened, a higher percentage
of migrants have sought assistance from professional people-smugglers (“coyotes”) to
reduce the probability of apprehension. For instance, the proportion of migrants using
coyotes rose from 15 to 41 percent in the last decade (México, CONAPO, 2004).
4 The Second Order Conditions for both maximization problems are also satisﬁed
since: −βiIEE(E,Y) ≤ 0, ∀βi∈ R+,i= u,s.
5 We also assume that legal immigrations have no right to vote. Thus only native
workers can vote.
6 In Hanson et al. (2002) it is shown for a range of empirical speciﬁcations and
deﬁnitions of regional labor markets, that border enforcement policy has little impact
on wages in U.S. border cities. However, even if this eﬀect is positive and suﬁcientlly
small, all the results remain the same.
7 Notice that in this case the assumption of decreasing eﬃcacy of border enforce-
ment with respect to the level of border enforcement itself is not a necessary condition
for the SOC to be satisﬁed.
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